This document is the result of a joint e ort to understand what are relevant factors to consider when there are several possible courses of action (COAs) to accomplish a Noncombatant E v acuation Operation (NEO) military mission. These relevant factors are useful for generation and evaluation of COAs and provide the basis for a good decision in selecting a C O A. The document compiles the relevant factors from the perspective of logistics that are useful to evaluate whether or not alternative proposed COAs can besupported logistically, and which ones seem to bebetter alternatives compared to the others. The ultimate goal of this joint e ort is to use these factors to automate the evaluation and comparison of COAs and use the comparison to determine what are critical aspects of a COA that may b e changed to produce a better option with a generative planner. We discuss how we envision using expect and O-Plan2 for this purpose.
Introduction
Generating qualitatively di erent plans is crucial in decision-making support systems within the Planning Initiative. Current planners are tasked such that all the alternative COAs generated are pretty much produced under some xed patterns. Typical patterns are to produce one COA that uses many resources but can bedeployed very fast, another that uses less resources and the deployment t a k es longer, another is somewhere in the middle, and another is a bit more extreme. Generating qualitatively di erent plans would allow m o r e v ariety and better quality solutions.
What we foresee as the framework is that an outer \strategic/task assignment" layer of the system performs some task analysis and sets direction. This would be used to set up de nite targets and constraints for the "tactical" planner to esh out. The tactics planner would thus establish that a plan was possible within the framework speci ed (keeping certain elements of evaluation at favorable levels). The planner would betasked with di erent such requirements to produce alternate plans which are qualitatively di erent.
The intent of this document is to add to the PRECiS domain description 5] such that together they provide a rich domain example that is simple enough for enabling technology research, but also that can be realistically evaluated and recognized as addressing real issues.
This document attempts to clarify the following issues:
1. Clear separation of task assignment and scoping of a request to a tactical planner. Why these di er and how it helps to clearly separate the two. 2. Need for criteria against which plans will beevaluated. Idea that the same criteria can be used to direct the planner from the task assigner and can also be used to evaluate alternatives produced.
Our main goals are the following:
To understand how domain criteria will be used to evaluate a plan however it was produced { manually, automatically or with mixed initiative.
To relate each of these domain criteria to plan features in order to ensure that these plan features can be reasoned about by future planners.
To give feedback to plan representation design e orts, to indicate which parts of the KRSL plan representation should be the primary targets for our work as being most relevant to domain issues of concern.
To design an evaluation function to rate plan alternatives which will guide alternatives selection, such that the planner is using the same knowledge in choice making that will be used to rate COA options by the higher level analysis and direction people. To in uence planner design and features to ensure that support is available to generate plans with the desirable domain features required.
This document runs as follows. After laying some background on the purpose of COA evaluations, the paper shows the evaluation factors relevant for NEO operations. We then describe in detail how to evaluate relevant factors from a logistics perspective. Finally, we discuss how the O-Plan2 and expect systems can cooperate in the generation and evaluation of alternative courses of action. The paper includes an appendix with a concrete example of how tentative COAs are described, evaluated, and compared.
Background
During the concept development phase of a plan, it is crucial to develop careful estimates of the situation and the alternative courses of action. This analysis can help in making certain that: a) a broad spectrum of possible courses of action is considered b) the uncertainties in each C O A are analyzed and estimated to reduce unknowns c) the analysis can beused as the basis for a commander's estimate and subsequent selection of the appropriate options.
The concept development phase is composed of the following steps 6]:
1. Mission Analysis. The CINC analyzes the mission and the assigned task. The result is a mission statement that contains the tasks to be accomplished and the purpose they achieve. These tasks are described by who/what/when/where/why/how. 2. Planning Guidance. The supported commander produces a planning directive, that contains several tentative courses of action and other information that is used as initial guidance for the analyses. Each tentative COA is described a sa series of elements composed of who/when/what/where. 3. Sta Estimates. The six sta divisions use the planning directive to analyze the situation, each one from a di erent perspective. J-1 is concerned with personnel, J-2 with intelligence, J-3 with operations, J-4 with logistics, J-5 with transportation, and J-6 is concerned with C 3 . The result of this analysis is a more re ned description of each tentative COA, as well as sta estimates of relevant factors. 4. Commander's Estimate. A commander's estimate that summarizes the sta estimates is put together that is the basis to select one of the tentative C O As. 5. Concept of Operations. Produce an OPLAN (operation plan) that fully develops the CINC's concept of operations and includes time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD).
The preparation of the sta estimates and the commander's estimate may be the most critical and time consuming task of task-sensitive planning operations. This is currently done by human planners, and our goal is to contribute to the automation (or partial automation) of this process.
Another important problem is that the generation of alternative courses of action cannot be ne-tuned because of time constraints. Courses of action turn out to be one of three types 7]:
1. conservative, using few forces, 2. use massive f o r c e s , 3. take little force with the hope that the operation will succeed anyway.
These three types are too gross grain and lie on stereotypical positions of the spectrum of possible alternatives. There are many tradeo s that should be considered. For example, using a large force is a trivial way to make an operation succeed. However, such COA is considered unacceptable because it is too expensive. The goal is to use the minimum amount of force su cient to hold the operation and of acceptable cost. If we increase automation during this phase, more satisfactory COAs will be produced.
Evaluation Factors for NEO Operations
In the sta estimates process, 23 of the 39 JOPES identi ed elements of evaluation (EEs) 4] are applicable to most NEO operations and should therefore beconsidered in the identi cation and recommendation of a NEO COA. Of these factors, many will remain constant across all COAs and are usually not addressed. Of those that di er, a few are identi ed as critical factors and are thus instrumental in the nomination of the recommended COA.
The 23 EEs are: As we described before, each sta division produces evaluations of COAs that take into account the factors relevant to that division. For example, the logistics directorate (J-4) is concerned with ensuring e ective logistic support for all forces, including transportation, supply, and maintenance issues. This section describes relevant factors to evaluate COAs from a logistics perspective i n m o r e detail than the previous section. The main factors from a logistics perspective are the following ve:
A-PORTS (Airports) | For each airport mentioned in COA, two aspects are evaluated: (1) number of sorties/day, and (2) the number of square feet of aircraft parking. LOCs (Lines of Communication) | This factor evaluates the operation in terms of how the di erent force modules involved will be able to communicate when they are physically distributed in di erent locations. It is usually quali ed as good, ok, or bad. Other factors considered include resupply capability o f airports and seaports in terms of storage and refrigeration, pre-positioned war reserve material stock, covered storage areas, logistics command and control, host nation support in terms of resources allocated by host country for the operation, medical services, the logistic over the shore, whether ships are stacked up at the seaports waiting to beunloaded, onward movement coordination, oil facilities gained, who is in charge of C2, whether forces must move to other locations, topography, C 3 p h ysical protection, climate and weather, and enemy C 3 C M .
S-PORTS (Seaports)
|
Estimating the Value of Relevant Factors for COA Evaluation
The value of most factors is estimated using back of the envelope calculations. The estimates for the ve logistics factors being considered are calculated as follows:
A-PORTS: For all the airports mentioned in COA, add number of sorties/day allocated to the operation by the host nation. aircraft parking space available.
S-PORTS:
For all the seaports mentioned in COA, add number of piers in the seaport. numberofcargoberths. maximum size of vessels allowed by the seaports of the COA. This is calculated by taking the maximum length of the types of cargo berths available in all the seaports.
Closure Date: Maximum of airlift and sealift closure times. The procedure to calculate the airlift closure is described in detail in 8].
LOG PER: The logistics personnel needed is a function of the size of the personnel involved in the operation. It can beestimated as a percentage of the people who compose the force modules involved in the COA. First, the total amount of troops to bemoved is calculated. These troops come from any non-organic units involved in the COA. We take an 8% of the total personnel as unloading support personnel, 0.42% of the total personnel for each airport as airport support personnel, and 1% of the total personnel for each seaport as seaport support personnel.
LOCs: There are three relevant aspects to evaluate: number of locations maximum distance between those locations (in miles) whether or not there are both air and sea locations.
Comparing Alternative COAs
Once the factors relevant for the evaluation have been estimated for each C O A, the COAs can be compared against each other to produce a comparison matrix. The matrix is lled out with pluses and/or minuses depending on how the alternative C O As compare.
A-PORTS is better the more throughput they have, which depends mostly on sorties and parking. S-PORTS is better the more berths of bigger size that they have. The closure date is better the closer it is to the D day. LOG PERS is good if it is not a large number.
LOCs are compared as follows. If only one geoloc involved in COA, then they are good. If two geolocs, then they are ok. If three or more geolocs, they are bad. It is better if the locations are close to each other and also if they are far from the enemy border. It is also good if there are both air and sea locations.
In general there are tradeo s in these factors. For example, the more portsin the COA the better A-PORTS and S-PORTS, but LOG PERS increases and that is not so good. This is key to give f e e d b a c k to a generative planner from this evaluation: to keep a g o o d value in a factor while improving in another one.
Generating Qualitatively Di erent Plans: EXPECT and OPlan2
This section describes our ideas to combine the COA generation via O-Plan2 and the COA e v aluation capabilities of expect within the Planning Initiative. We rst present very brie y the two systems, then we show h o w they can be combined.
O-Plan2
The O-Plan2 Project at the Arti cial Intelligence Applications Institute of the University of Edinburgh is exploring a practical computer based environment to provide for speci cation, generation, interaction with, and execution of activity plans. O-Plan2 is intended to be a domain-independent general planning and control framework with the ability t o e m bed detailed knowledge of the domain. The overall O-Plan2 plan representation and system allows for "tasks" (Missions, constraints, resources, etc) to be explored and compared in a supportive i n terface for doing plan option analysis. This strategic "Task Assignment" level gives more speci c tactical requirements to the computer planner and human planner who work with mixed initiative alongside each other. Neither is "in charge" in our system -they bothare "editing" plans constrained by the mission options being explored and the "authority" given to them for planning or execution. Finally, when a COA t o b e used as a basis for operations is selected, operational planning and execution monitoring support is o ered along with some simple forms of plan repair to keep things on track.
The Edinburgh O-Plan2 prototype is currently being demonstrated generating plans in a cut down Tunisian IFD-2 scenario. Work is now underway for mid 1994 to demonstrate the O-Plan2 planner working with an enriched resource model of NEO evacuee transportation in the PRECiS domain. A later demonstration in 1995 is intended to show h o w plans can be generated and their execution monitored and simple xes applied in the PRECiS domain.
EXPECT
The goal of the expect project of the Information Sciences Institute of the University of Southern California is to provide an environment for the development of knowledge-based systems that aids in the acquisition, maintenance, and documentation of the knowledge about a task.
The expect architecture 9, 10, 11] is being applied to producing sta estimates for tentative courses of action to produce brie ngs for a commander. To date, we h a ve a prototype system that takes an assessment of the situation and evaluates relevant factors for the alternative courses of action from the logistics perspective. The system has a map-based interface that displays force deployment, and allows the user to analyze factor evaluations through interactive dialogues. The user can correct the system's knowledge about how to compute these evaluations if a knowledge de ciency is detected. The user can also correct the system's knowledge base to add new relevant factors or to expand the level of detail at which the evaluations are computed. Figure 1 shows how the two systems could cooperate to produce better alternatives. O-Plan2's generated COAs are given to expect. expect evaluates these COAs, and gives feedback to OPlan's evaluation function in terms of what factors can be improved to produce a better COA. A higher level Mission Tasking component provides the framework within which options are being explored and compared.
Generating Qualitatively Di erent Plans
The Advisor module would provide the feedback t o m a k e a C O A of better quality. This feedback can beat di erent levels of detail. The more details, the easier it is for a generative planner to operationalize the feedback. For example, a high-level piece of feedback could be \The airlift closure date needs to be a day earlier," while a more detailed one would be \use a bigger airport." Scienti c Research (afsc) under contract f49620-92-c-0042. The United States Government is authorised to reproduce and distribute reprints for government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon.
Dave Brown from MITRE and Tom Karmiezak from SRA provided very useful expertise that we included in this document. Of course, any inaccuracies and misinterpretations remain ours. The following are the alternative C O As for this scenario.
A An Example Scenario
COA 1 (Delta) | On D day, the MEU 1 will conduct amphibious operations in Delta and the LIB 2 will airland in Delta. Starting on D+2 and ending no later than D+5, the ACR 3 will beginunloading in Delta. Starting on D+5 and ending no later than D+15, the MID 4 will begin unloading in Delta. The MEU will reimbark no later than D+9. On D day, the CVBG 5 will MODLOC near Barnacle.
COA 2 (Calypso) | On D day, the MEU will conduct amphibious operations in Calypso and the LIB will airland in Calypso. Starting on D+2 and ending no later than D+5, the ACR will begin unloading in Calypso. Starting on D+5 and ending no later than D+15, the MID will beginunloading in Calypso. The MEU will reimbark no later than D+9. On D day, the CVBG will MODLOC near Barnacle.
COA 3 (Delta and Calypso) | O n D d a y, the MEU will conduct amphibious operations in Calypso and the LIB will airland in Delta. Starting on D+2 and ending no later than D+5, the ACR will begin unloading in Delta. Starting on D+2 and ending no later than D+15, 1 Brigade of the MID will begin unloading in Calypso. Starting on D+5 and ending no later than D+15, the rest of the MID will begin unloading in Delta. The MEU will reimbark no later than D+9. On D day, the CVBG will MODLOC near Barnacle.
COA 4 (Delta and Calypso and Abyss) | O n D d a y, the MEU will conduct amphibious operations in Calypso and the LIB will airland in Delta. On D+1, a LI Battalion will airland in Abyss. Starting on D+2 and ending no later than D+5, the ACR will begin unloading in Delta. Starting on D+2 and ending no later than D+15, 1 Brigade of the MID will beginunloading in Calypso. Starting on D+5 and ending no later than D+15, the rest of the MID will begin unloading in Delta. The MEU will reimbark no later than D+9. On D day, the CVBG will MODLOC near Barnacle. 
